9 For example, the "father" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Cong. John A. Bingham of Ohio, in a statement that represented the views of his congressional colleagues, declared that the authority to secure the rights of citizens "belongs to every sovereign power, and is essentially a subject of national jurisdiction." Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, p. 1090. This view of national sovereignty was also expressed outside of Congress. See the letter of "Madison" published in the New York Times (November 15, 1866): 2. Other scholars have noted this interpretation, but they reached different conclusions concerning the scope of authority the amendment delegated to Congress. See Belz, 48 Robert . Kaczorowski as a constitutional guarantee of the status of Americans as free people and therefore as a delegation of authority to Congress to secure the fundamental rights of American citizens. Congressional Republicans reasoned that the amendment, in abolishing slavery, secured liberty and the rights of free people. They equated the status and rights of free people with the status and natural rights of citizens.
Congressional Republicans understood the Thirteenth Amendment as a guarantee of the status and rights of citizenship. Applying a Hamiltonian, nationalistic interpretation of the Constitution, which attributed to Congress the authority to secure rights that are recognized or guaranteed by the Constitution, they concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment delegated to Congress the authority to prohibit slavery and, more important, the authority to secure inherent rights of all U.S. citizens against violation from any source in whatever manner Congress deemed appropriate. IO Thus, James F. Wilson, the representative from Iowa and the House floor manager of the Civil Rights Bill, introduced it with the explanation "that the possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect them."1'
Republicans expressed in law their understanding of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment when they enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act confers citizenship on all qualified American inhabitants and guarantees to all American citizens at least some of the rights the framers believed to be fundamental. 12 They added a similar citizenship clause to the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment in the event that a subsequent Congress repealed the Civil Rights Act. The addition of this clause was also designed to prevent courts from declaring the statute unconstitutional by " The framers believed that the Congress possessed plenary authority over civil rights, as established by the following: Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866 " Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, pp. 1118-19. I established that this was also the understanding of U.S. judges and attorneys in Politics of Judicial Interpretation, 1-12, 27-48.
12 Section I provides that such citizens "shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, pur-chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding"; 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
To Begin the Nation Anew 49 interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment as a mere abrogation of slavery.'3 The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes explicit the constitutional recognition of the status and natural rights of citizens that its framers believed was implied in the Thirteenth Amendment. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 thus completed the constitutional revolution regarding citizenship and civil rights. Congressional Republicans legislated to secure the civil rights of Americans in 1866 with the understanding that, with the Thirteenth and then the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution of the United States gave to all Americans the fundamental rights of citizenship and delegated to Congress the authority to protect citizens in their enjoyment of these rights.14 A striking feature of the framers' intent in 1866 is their adoption of the most radical abolitionist theory of constitutionalism before the Civil War. 15 By 1866, not only radicals but all moderate and even some conservative Republicans supported the efforts of Congress to secure civil rights. 16 This shift reveals the extent to which the Civil War radicalized American politics. A political and constitutional position regarded as extreme and embraced by a very small minority before the Civil War had become mainstream Republicanism by 1866. The position that contemporaries regarded as radical in 1866 was securing the voting rights of blacks. As a matter of law and as a matter of political objectives, most contemporaries distinguished between civil rights and voting rights.'7 The essential reason that Radical Republicans criticized the Fourteenth Amendment as too moderate was its failure to provide the same protection for voting rights as for civil rights.18
The full reach of this revolution in constitutionalism could have changed the nature of American government from a federal republic with divided authority 27 The conclusion that Southerners abused white Unionists and freed blacks and that observers interpreted this abuse as hostility toward and resistance to federal authority was expressed in letters to congressional Republicans, such as those cited in note 24 above and the following: William Ware Peck to Charles Sumner, 1 January 1866, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; and George W. In 1866, the political context of civil rights deprivations compelled Congress to take effective measures to secure the fundamental rights of American citizens.
Although Republicans shrank from providing freed blacks with economic independence through land redistribution, they did offer legal recognition of their liberty by securing important rights for their economic autonomy, such as the rights to enter into contracts and to buy and sell property. Congressional Republicans put aside racial prejudice that ordinarily would have precluded the legal enforcement of civil rights.29 The factors motivating them included the perceived need to preserve the objectives for which so many thousands gave their lives, the obligation to make effective the freedom they had promised to Southern blacks, a sense of elemental fairness and justice, as well as political self-interest. All is idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor, whereby alone he can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the rewards of labor. . . Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are others, such as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security 45 The Neuw York Evening Post commented that the Civil Rights Act declared who were citizens and what rights they had. Yet the Post also insisted that the statute did not "usurp the power of the local To Begin the Nation Anew 57 national uniformity in the rights that citizens possessed as citizens, they also provided for local variations in the ways in which citizens exercised these rights.
The framers thus preserved a federal constitutional structure of government that distributed authority over fundamental rights to both the national and state governments but delegated ultimate authority to the national government.
Judges understood the Republican legal theory of civil rights enforcement authority that underlay the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to be a blend of concurrent authority and exclusive national authority. Although the fundamental rights of citizenship, such as those specified in the Civil Rights Act, were secured to all citizens under national law, and the states could not deny these rights to any citizen, the states were still permitted to determine the conditions under which these civil rights were to be exercised, so long as state law did not conflict with national law or until Congress exercised the authority to prescribe these conditions. In 1867, of the national government and the heightened sense of nationalism generated by the Civil War, the states were still better suited to be the guardians of civil rights.
The national government simply did not have the resources to take on this new function without the assistance of state governments. Nor was it necessary, let alone desirable, for the national government to supplant state civil and criminal codes, courts, and enforcement agencies, or to handle ordinary crimes and civil suits.48
Another point of debate over the framers' concept of a congressional civil rights enforcement authority concerns whether the framers merely intended to secure a racial equality in state law or whether they intended to protect rights directly. I have argued that the framers believed Congress possessed the authority to enforce civil rights directly and to redress any violations of civil rights. Whether or not Congress chose to exercise this authority to its full extent, however, is another question. The framers' understanding of the full scope of congressional authority to enforce civil rights is a separate question from that of the scope of authority the framers exercised to enforce civil rights in 1866. Whatever the framers' intent, they permitted the statute and the amendment to go forward with the revolutionary potential that a broad reading entailed.
Federal legal officers and judges certainly interpreted and applied the statute to secure more than racially impartial state law. The Civil Rights Act authorized these law enforcement officers to directly redress civil and criminal violations of civil rights. Sections 1 and 3, as they were applied by federal officers, created a private civil cause of action for the infringement of the rights that the Civil Rights Some supporters of the bill explicitly expressed their intention to delegate to the federal courts the primary jurisdiction over civil rights. When Wilson introduced the Civil Rights Bill in the House, he declared that U.S. citizens were entitled to the great fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property that free governments are obliged to secure, and that, because the states refused to protect these rights for some citizens, "we must do our duty by supplying the protection which the The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also limited its scope because they intended to match federal sanctions to the specific violations of civil rights that required national intervention, just as the framers of the 1870 and 1871 statutes specified other kinds of offenses that confronted them. In other words, they shaped federal criminal sanctions to provide effective civil rights protection where and when it was needed. Black victims of racially motivated civil rights violations who were unable to redress their grievances within the state criminaljustice system had the greatest need for federal protection in 1866; consequently, the Act mnade civil rights violations that were motivated by discriminatory intent federal crimes.
Senator Trumbull explained that the words, "'under color of law' were inserted as words of limitation . . . If an offense is committed against a colored person simply because he is colored, in a state where the law affords the same protection as if he were white, this act neither has nor was intended to have anything to do laws and courts could be relied on to provide adequate remedies for ordinary violations of the rights to life, liberty, and property, Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act constituted an additional sanction for these violations when they were committed under a discriminatory law or custom. As Senator Trumbull described it, the framers believed a federal sanction was required because victims would be unable to secure their rights when the violations stemmed from discriminatory laws or community prejudices.
The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend federal jurisdiction over civil rights to be limited to racially discriminatory state action, as the Supreme Court later held in Slaughterhouse and Even though the inclusion of public officials within the penal sections of the Act was extraordinary, the framers insisted that prosecuting them for civil rights offenses was imperative. Punishing political leaders for civil rights violations would be far more effective in curbing these crimes than punishing ordinary citizens would. Senator Trumbull elaborated: "When it comes to be understood in all parts of the United States that any person who shall deprive another of any right or subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color or race will expose himself to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts will cease."69 The framers hoped the public would realize that even those thought to be beyond prosecution because they wielded governmental authority were subject to the Act's provi- The framers expressly distinguished between racially discriminatory laws and Federal judges and legal officers interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as conferring a broad authority to enforce civil rights directly, irrespective of the presence of discriminatory state action and regardless of the source of the violation, because these rights were the natural rights that belonged to all free citizens of a free republic.
Indeed, the notion that a national civil rights enforcement authority was merely a guarantee of racially impartial government action was not judicially recognized in the federal courts until the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1870s.83
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